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rAbstract
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first study evaluating the effects of higher
education for adults on the timing of retirement. Using detailed longitudinal
population register data 1982–2010, we track first-time enrollees in higher education
in 1992–1993. Our sample is aged 42–55 at the time of enrollment and thus aged
60–73 in 2010. We find that higher education increases labor market survival rates
when aged 61–66 by about 5 percentage points. The estimates represent relatively
large effects. Tentative calculations indicate that if enrollment occurs at age 42, the
retirement delay represents about one percent in yearly earnings returns per year of
tertiary education.
JEL classification: H52, H55, I28
Keywords: Human capital; Education; Labor supply; Retirement; Pensions1. Introduction
The OECD and the EU have encouraged governments to stimulate retraining of older
workers (OECD 1998, 2001, EU 2007, 2008), reflecting a widespread view that inad-
equate educations constitute an important reason for early retirement. Indeed, several
kinds of research results have implied that high skilled are less likely to leave full-time
employment and less sensitive to labor market fluctuations (Peracchi and Welch 1994,
Blau 2005, Maestas and Zissimopoulos 2010, Blau and Goodstein 2010)1. The sug-
gested underlying mechanisms include direct effects in terms of improved matching to
market demand of skills, complementarities between formal education and on-the-job
-training (Fouarge and Schils 2009), that technological changes favor high skilled
workers as they are more likely to receive on-the-job-training (Bartel and Sicherman
1993, Brunello 2003,Arulampalam et al. 2004), and/or that education affects health
and thereby explain prolonged labor force participation (Kalwij and Vermeulen 2005).
These studies all consider education completed at a young age, providing what may ap-
pear as reasonable basis that education for adults postpone the timing of retirement.
However, there is no direct empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis, presumably
as it requires access to very long time-series of data on earnings, pensions and other
indicators of labor force status, as well as data on adult education2. In addition, the
theoretical predictions are ambiguous as education may increase individuals’ life time
income streams from both earnings and pensions. The effect on the timing of retire-
ment then depends on the individuals’ time preferences and/or the relation betweenStenberg and Westerlund; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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long as the option value of remaining in the work force is positive (Stock and Wise
1990). The theoretical ambiguity gives empirical studies an important role for our un-
derstanding of if and/or how educational investments influence the timing of retire-
ment. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first analysis of retirement
behavior of adults who invest in formal higher education.
The purpose of this paper is to study whether adult education (henceforth AE) at ter-
tiary level starting at age 42 or later delays decisions to retire. The analysis is based on
Swedish population register data which include information on registration in higher
education since 1977, on annual earnings 1982–2010, and on retirement pension pay-
ments 1990–2010. To control for the endogeneity of the decision to enroll AE, we use
propensity score matching, exploiting very detailed data which includes annual earnings
ten years prior to enrollment, information on family characteristics, sector of employ-
ment and transfers related to unemployment, sick-leave, social welfare and early retire-
ment. In robustness checks, we consider potential unobservable confounders such as
systematic differences in time horizons and pre-program dynamics in earnings and
transfers, but the overall implications of our results remain stable3.
Earlier studies of adults aged 40 or above in formal education have generally found
positive effects on earnings when enrolling community college in the US (Jacobson
et al. 2005a, b) or upper secondary education in Sweden (Stenberg and Westerlund
2008, Stenberg et al. 2011). Regarding the timing of retirement, Stenberg et al. (2012)
reported no effects of upper secondary schooling completed at age 42 or higher.
Neither males nor females who enrolled in Swedish upper secondary education 1986–
1989, when aged 42–55, differ in their timing of retirement relative to matched
comparisons, observed up and until 2004 when aged 60–73. This result holds across a
variety of subgroups.
We have found only two other studies addressing whether adult educational invest-
ments affect the timing of retirement. Kristensen (2012) considers a hybrid between
formal education and on-the-job training and Battistin et al. (2013) examine on-the-job
training. Kristensen (2012) analyzes government co-sponsored training in Denmark for
individuals born 1936–1944. This type of training was very prevalent during the period
1980–2004, which the data of the study covers, because if training took place during
work hours, the government reimbursed the equivalent of the unemployment insurance
benefits of the participant. About 40 percent of the individuals were at some point in
training, “usually” encompassing less than two weeks of courses. The results indicate
no significant effects of post-secondary courses on the timing of retirement, and signifi-
cant but small effects following basic education or vocational courses. Translated to
one year of full time training, this effect corresponds to about a one month extension
of working life. Battistin et al. (2013), in contrast, reports a notable delay in retirement
following on-the-job-training in Italy. They exploit exogenous variation in both
mandatory minimum early retirement age and government regional training subsidies
during the 1990s and early 2000s, reporting that an extra month of on-the-job-training
reduces the probability of retirement by 5 percent. The authors consider the estimated
effect on labor force participation to be substantial.
The contribution of the present study is that we examine the effects of formal ter-
tiary/higher education on the timing of retirement. Our results indicate that higher
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skilled in formal schooling found in Stenberg et al. (2012). The difference in findings
are possibly explained by the “job polarization” hypothesis (Goos and Manning 2007),
suggesting that the demand for medium skilled performing routine tasks has dropped
relatively to the demand for labor in the tails of the skill distribution. The premium for
medium-skilled upgrading to high-skilled may then be higher compared with that of
low-skilled making the transition to mid-skilled4.
In the following, we provide a description of the institutional framework for AE in
Sweden and a presentation of data. The empirical model and our identification strategy
are outlined in Section 3 while Section 4 contains the results. The findings are summa-
rized and discussed in Section 5.
2. Institutional setting, data and descriptive statistics
To stimulate participation and the demand for education among adults, employees in
Sweden are since 1974 legally entitled to be on leave for studies and afterwards be rein-
stated with equal working conditions and wages. Participants are also eligible for financial
support of about €1000 per month (2010 values), sufficient for a modest level of consump-
tion. One third of the funding must be repaid within 25 years from the year the studies
have been completed. Education is generally publicly funded and free of charge but a few
programs are in excess demand with admittance then decided by grades from the final
(third or fourth) year of upper secondary education. However, pre-enrollment tests provide
an alternative route to qualify and in the 1990s working life experience gave extra grade
points. If one also considers the vast supply of decentralized tertiary level education, offered
in about 30 cities in a total population of 9 million, virtually all individuals with a three year
secondary level exam were eligible to conduct some form of tertiary level education. To
the extent that some individuals were still excluded because of insufficient qualifications,
we assume that this will be controlled for by observed attributes in the empirical model.
The data in this study stems from various population registers administered by Statis-
tics Sweden. It contains panel micro level data of all individuals registered as Swedish
residents. Annual earnings are available 1982–2010 and from 1990 there is also yearly
data on a richer set of individual background characteristics, including family situation
and information on transfers related to social insurance systems and retirement pen-
sions. Information on course registrations and completions in higher education are
available from 1977. These records are very reliable as the distribution of resources to
higher education in large part is determined by the numbers registered and completion
of course credits5. There were about 256,000 individuals registered in higher education
in 1992–1993, and about ten percent among them were born 1937–1950. Our study is
restricted to a subset of these individuals. First, all individuals are conditioned to have a
three year upper secondary education as their highest attained level of schooling6. Sec-
ond, individuals are defined as treated if they registered in higher education for the first
time in 1992 or 1993. Thus, importantly, we simplify the interpretation of AE enroll-
ment by excluding all individuals registered in tertiary education 1979–19917. We also
exclude individuals who immigrated to Sweden after age seven, to make it likely that
individuals have gone through the same educational system. The remaining sample
consists of 159,760 individuals, of which 4,558 were treated. The large number of un-
treated is advantageous for the process of finding appropriate comparisons.
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separately for males and females. About two thirds of the treated were females, which
is in line with what has been observed for secondary education for adults (e.g. Stenberg
et al. 2012). Enrollees are on average younger than the non-treated, with the gap in
average age just above one year for both males and females. The means of incidence of
social benefits and labor market programs indicate important differences between
males and females regarding selectivity into education. The amount of completed
higher education among treated was on average .77 years for males and 1.16 for
females.
Figure 1 displays earnings trajectories 1982–2010 and retirement pension incomes re-
ceived 1990–2010 for treated and untreated. The level of earnings in the 1980s is mark-
edly lower among treated, which could contrast to the traditional view on selection in
to education based on ability. While earnings are powerful controls for labor market
productivity, earnings of females may be a less adequate measure due to family respon-
sibilities. We therefore also construct a complementary measure of inherent productiv-
ity via a variable which reveals the highest earnings rank 1982–1990, conditional on
age8. Between 1990 and 1993, unemployment rates in Sweden soared from 2 to 11 per-
cent. This is visible in the slight drop in earnings among untreated, but the drop is
more pronounced among treated. This is expected since, at the time of enrollment,
some factor has presumably changed to make the expected net present value of AE
positive. The obvious example of such a change is job-loss, which decreases the oppor-
tunity costs, but many other examples are given in the literature9.
There is no consensus in the applied economics literature on how to identify the
point in time for the transition from work to retirement (Denton and Spencer 2009).
Our baseline definition is that retirement occurs in the year when we first observe that
an individual’s received retirement pensions (pit) exceed labor earnings (eit). This means
that an individual is defined as remaining on the labor market as long as pit < eit but is
retired in the first year we observe pit ≥ eit (alternative definitions are discussed in the
empirical section). Figure 2 displays the Kaplan Meier survival rates in the labor force
of treated and untreated from 1994 until 2010. In the raw data, the survival rates of the
treated remain significantly higher throughout this period. This could of course reflect
differences in characteristics, e.g. the age of the respective samples.
To interpret the survival rates by calendar year, one must keep in mind that most of
the variation in retirement occurs around ages 61–66. It means that for the older half
of our sample, born 1937–1944, differences would primarily arise in the middle of our
observation window, while in the last few years virtually everyone is retired (with the
1944 cohort in 2010 aged 66). For our younger half, born 1944–1950, there are modest
proportions of retirees up and until roughly 2004 when the cohort born 1944 turns 60.
Thus, there are overall only small treated-untreated differences prior to 2000 and the
observed differences thereafter are generated by different age-segments of the sample.
To facilitate interpretation, Figure 3 displays the Kaplan Meier survival rates of
our samples by age (44–68, numbers remaining at older ages is very small). The
share of retired increases between age 64 and 68 from about 30 percent to more
than 90 percent. Note that only our youngest cohort born 1950 is observed at age
44 (in 1994), for every age increment, an older cohort is added to increase the num-
ber of observations. The total sample is observed for ages 57–60 as our oldest
Table 1 Descriptive averages of treated and untreated as measured in 1990, unless stated otherwise
Males Females
AE No AE p-valuea) Matched comparisons p-valuea) AE No AE p-valuea) Matched comparisons p-valuea)
Age in 1992 b) 46.56 47.85 .000 46.65 .495 46.07 47.17 .000 46.07 .982
Born 1937 .022 .046 .000 .028 .340 .013 .034 .000 .014 .581
Born 1950 .105 .071 .000 .107 .904 .139 .099 .000 .142 .770
No. of children at home 1.411 1.286 .000 1.437 .551 1.488 1.290 .000 1.488 .981
Married .684 .742 .000 .676 .632 .716 .698 .033 .708 .520
Divorced .120 .114 .510 .111 .485 .169 .161 .272 .165 .734
Humanities track .013 .013 .980 .012 .737 .033 .097 .000 .032 .887
Business track .046 .089 .000 .046 .999 .079 .383 .000 .086 .289
Engineering track .265 .437 .000 .252 .420 .022 .045 .000 .020 .595
Professional track .158 .366 .000 .169 .421 .369 .210 .000 .352 .162
Inland of Norrland c) .069 .046 .000 .068 .883 .076 .032 .000 .077 .887
Stockholm county c) .131 .227 .000 .126 .697 .134 .277 .000 .137 .711
Foreign born .019 .018 .668 .017 .576 .013 .019 .010 .012 .909
Regional employment .822 .829 .000 .822 .975 .825 .832 .000 .825 .399
Farming and mining .027 .020 .071 .026 .908 .016 .014 .370 .013 .240
Construction .079 .130 .000 .073 .527 .012 .023 .000 .015 .326
Manufacturing .271 .299 .023 .267 .801 .076 .144 .000 .071 .467
Finance, insurance .113 .157 .000 .114 .953 .081 .204 .000 .084 .712
Public sector .228 .105 .000 .242 .380 .579 .289 .000 .589 .441
Earnings 1990 227.6 289.1 .000 227.8 .954 158.8 182.9 .000 156.5 .219
Earnings 1982 196.9 236.9 .000 197.6 .849 106.0 124.9 .305 106.4 .832


















Table 1 Descriptive averages of treated and untreated as measured in 1990, unless stated otherwise (Continued)
Highest earnings rank 1982-1990 - - - .503 .635 .000 .504 .965
Unemp. insurance (UI) > 0 .046 .016 .000 .038 .267 .072 .040 .000 .070 .767
average amount if > 0 31.0 35.0 .294 31.5 .441 22.4 23.6 .447 24.1 .725
ALMP benefits > 0 .058 .009 .000 .052 .463 .045 .023 .000 .047 .671
average amount if > 0 18.6 22.2 .274 24.3 .557 28.6 26.2 .330 28.5 .782
Parental leave benefits > 0 .029 .014 .000 .026 .650 .024 .018 .019 .021 .440
average amount if > 0 11.9 11.4 .852 15.7 .658 23.4 29.5 .147 20.3 .315
Sick-leave benefits > 0 .655 .584 .000 .664 .638 .773 .716 .000 .770 .763
average amount if > 0 17.3 9.8 .000 16.6 .787 9.7 9.0 .058 10.0 .745
Social welfare benefits > 0 .042 .017 .000 .033 .239 .038 .021 .000 .038 .999
average amount if > 0 9.6 6.1 .009 8.9 .401 5.3 5.3 .930 6.0 .635
At some point registered in HE 1.000 .018 .000 .028 .000 1.000 .041 .000 .052 .000
Completed HE on average .773 .009 .000 .020 .000 1.165 .025 .000 .036 .000
Fraction completed less than 1 year .503 .011 .000 .013 .000 .391 .023 .000 .029 .000
Fraction completed 1–2 years .233 .005 .000 .010 .000 .146 .012 .000 .015 .000
Fraction completed 2–3 years .119 .001 .000 .003 .000 .307 .002 .000 .004 .000
Fraction completed 3 years or more .145 .001 .000 .002 .000 .156 .004 .000 .004 .000
N 1,445 113,183 1,445 3,113 42,019 3,113
Amounts given in thousands of SEK (2004 prices), € 100 was app. SEK 970.
a) t-test for equality between average of treated and untreated matched comparisons.
b) Balancing tests also include age dummies (14 categories), dummies for number of children (six categories), age of children (six categories) and annual earnings each year 1982–1990.
c) The inland of Norrland is a sparsely populated area in the north of Sweden with permanently higher than average unemployment rates. Stockholm County hosts 20 percent of the population, and the overall




















Figure 1 Descriptive statistics, trajectories of earnings 1982–2010 and retirement pension
incomes 1990–2010.
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gest cohort (born 1950) is observed for the last time aged 60 (in 2010). Subse-
quently, for each age category above 60, the youngest cohort drops out and at age
73 only our oldest cohort (born 1937) remains.
Figure 4 shows the differences between the age-related survival rates, and 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. At ages 61–66, the proportions remaining on the labor
market is on average higher among treated males and females, by 5.2 and 5.8 per-
centage points respectively. This implies that the difference observed in Figure 2
cannot be explained by age alone. There is no officially stated retirement age in
Sweden. Older employees are covered by the general employment protection legisla-
tion until aged 67. The threshold was increased from 65 to 67 in 2003 but it was
only gradually implemented as it could be overruled by existing collective agree-
ments signed before 2003. In our sample, the proportion still active at age 65 is
about 3 percentage points higher in 2010 than in 200510.
MALES
FEMALES
Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier survival rates in the labor force 1994–2010; unmatched samples.
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To identify the impact of AE on retirement decisions, we employ propensity score
matching adapted for duration outcomes as in de Luna and Johansson (2010) and
Fredriksson and Johansson (2008). Thus, treated individuals are matched with a com-
parison group obtained by nearest-neighbor matching on the propensity score (e.g.
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Smith and Todd 2005). In a second step, we compare the
timing of retirement of treated and matched comparisons by non-parametric estima-
tion of survival in the labor force. The propensity score is obtained from Probit model
estimates of the probability of being treated. For each given participant in AE, the un-
treated individual with the “nearest” propensity score is selected as the matched com-
parison. We use one-to-one matching as our baseline, also employing four to one
matching as a robustness check with improved precision but at the risk of generating
bias. The applied method provides a relevant estimate of the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT) even if there is heterogeneity in treatment effects.
For a causal interpretation of our estimates, the main assumptions necessary are: i)
the estimated probability of enrollment is strictly positive and strictly below one; ii)
MALES
FEMALES
Figure 3 Kaplan-Meier survival rates by age; unmatched samples.
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unit treatment value assumption, SUTVA, or no interference assumption); iii) condi-
tional on our covariates, unobservable attributes affecting AE enrollment are independ-
ent of the outcome variable. This last “unconfoundedness assumption” is crucial as our
estimation technique is based on selection on observables. With non experimental data,
it is not possible to rule out that treated and their matched comparisons systematically
differ in some unobserved aspect which affects decisions on both enrollment and on re-
tirement. For some guidance on this matter, several empirical studies have assessed
non experimental estimators (Heckman and Smith 1999, Table 7, Heckman et al. 1999
ch 10, Smith and Todd 2005, Diaz and Handa 2006). These studies have had access to
a treatment effect estimate based on experimental evidence. This is used as a bench-
mark and compared with results from “robustness checks” where the randomized con-
trol group has been substituted with a conventional non-experimental data set. The
results indicate that bias is modest in estimators based on non-experimental data, but
only as long as data is of high quality. Considering that our register data is unusually
rich and accurate, free from measurement errors due to recall errors, rounding errors
MALES
FEMALES
Figure 4 Differences in Kaplan-Meier survival rates by age; unmatched samples.
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ical evidence11.
Table 2 provides selected coefficient estimates from Probit regressions for the prob-
ability of treatment. The coefficients are informative in terms of answering the question
“who enrolls”, but the primary purpose is to provide us with fitted values of the individ-
ual’s propensity to enroll, which is at the basis of the ensuing matching procedure12.
Balancing tests for the samples of males and females are presented in Table 1 (selected
variables). In all, there are no unbalanced variables, i.e. the samples of treated and their
matched comparisons display no significant differences in average characteristics. In
total, we check the balance between treated and the untreated comparison groups with
regard to educational track completed at three year upper secondary level (5 categor-
ies), employment sector (7 categories), age (14 categories), number of children at home
(6), age of children (6), rural or metropolitan area (3), regional employment rate, five
different kinds of social insurance benefits related to unemployment insurance (UI),
parental leave, sick-leave, early retirement pensions and social welfare, applying both
dummy variables (incidence of the various benefits) and continuous measures of
Table 2 Probit model maximum likelihood estimation of the propensity score, variables
measured in 1990, unless stated otherwise
Dependent variable: binary indicator variable of registration in higher education 1992-1993.
Males Females
Coefficient Std.Err. Coefficient Std.Err.
Humanities track -.733 *** (.107) -.794 *** (.046)
Business track -.938 *** (.049) −1.268 *** (.084)
Engineering track -.830 *** (.029) -.603 *** (.058)
Professional track −1.121 *** (.031) .060 (.040)
Construction -.093 (.064)
Manufacturing .020 (.056) -.181 *** (.058)
Finance, insurance -.126 ** (.061) -.150 *** (.054)
Public sector .289 *** (.057) .429 *** (.047)
Earnings 1990 a) -.087 *** (.015) -.166 *** (.030)
Highest earnings rank 1982-1990 .073 *** (.024)
ALMP benefits > 0 .391 *** (.068) .375 *** (.093)
- amount if above zero a) -.799 *** (.246)
Parental leave benefits > 0
- amount if above zero a) .092 (.333) -.307 * (.178)
Sick-leave benefits > 0 .056 ** (.025) .116 *** (.026)
- amount if above zero a) .255 *** (.057)
Social welfare benefits > 0 .139 ** (.059)
- amount if above zero a)
- amount if above zero a) -.081 (.217)
Regional employment 1991 b) −2.884 *** (.551)
Inland of Norrland 1991 .313 *** (.043)
Stockholm county 1991 -.199 *** (.039) -.338 *** (.058)
Married -.013 (.035) .096 *** (.032)
Divorced .012 (.043) .111 *** (.038)
Foreign born .018 (.082) -.140 * (.084)
One child at home .026 (.034)
Two children at home .057 * (.035) -.081 *** (.029)
Three children at home .159 *** (.044) -.057 (.043)
Four children at home .049 (.085)
Five children or more at home .317 ** (.134)
Child home aged 0-3 .035 (.046)
Child home aged 4-6 -.080 * (.042) .051 (.045)
Children aged 7-10 .094 *** (.031)
Children aged 11-15 .135 *** (.026)
Children aged 16-17 .076 *** (.026)
Children aged 18 or over .141 *** (.024)
Pseudo R2 .154 .163
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level. ** at the 5% level. * at the 10% level.
a) SEK 2004 prices divided by 100,000, € 100 was approximately SEK 970.
b) Regressions include age dummies and in the case of males an interaction term between Humanities tracking and two
children at home. For females, also included are the following interactions: business track interacted with earnings 1990,
1987, two children at home, manufacturing, incidence of ALMP benefits, amount of ALMP benefit. Professional track
interacted with “other” sector, earnings 1982, incidence of ALMP benefits, amount of ALMP benefit. Stockholm interacted
with incidence of sick-leave benefits.
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treatment annual earnings levels and earnings trajectories (changes) 1982 – 1990.
The main threat to our identification strategy is that unobserved ability (or productivity)
is correlated with the enrollment decisions. If ability also influences future decisions on the
timing of retirement, we risk confounding the impact of education with unobservable indi-
vidual attributes. Our controls for ability include information on annual earnings, which
are matched between treated and matched comparisons 1982–1990. Adding information
on transfers related to both unemployment, family characteristics and labor market
marginalization, we believe our identification strategy appears reasonable, not least in view
of that several of the above mentioned studies have emphasized the importance of earnings
as a powerful control for self-selection into training programs13.
Issues which may still remain include differences in individuals’ “taste” for education,
preferences for leisure and differences in time horizons (Hairault et al. 2010, Magnac
et al. 2013). Even if individuals are identical in terms of expected yearly returns and
costs of education, different time horizons (or taste for education) may produce differ-
ent enrollment decisions. In the present case, the sample is conditioned to have the
same completed years of schooling, and no prior participation in formal AE earlier in
life, which decreases heterogeneity of samples. Our empirical framework also means
that confounders which could bias our results are limited to those remaining after con-
ditioning on our rich set of covariates. As a further check if such confounders remain,
Section 4 contains robustness checks where we exclude individuals for whom there is
least common support in data, i.e. observations in the tails of the propensity score dis-
tribution. As pointed out by Black and Smith (2004), selection bias due to unobserv-
ables is most severe in the tails of the distribution of the propensity score, given joint
normality in the distribution of the error terms of regressions on the participation and
the outcome. If a confounding factor drives the results, one would expect some attenu-
ation in our estimates as the samples are narrowed down by 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 per-
cent. In short, we find little evidence of this14.
Concerning pre-enrollment dynamics, our matched samples are as expected different
in terms of changes 1990–1991 in earnings and employment status prior to AE enroll-
ment. The conventional view in the program evaluation literature has been that an
earnings dip prior to enrollment reflects a temporary change. It is therefore excluded
from the control variables as it would otherwise risk generating upward biased esti-
mates (Ashenfelter 1978). In line with this convention, our Probit specification only in-
cludes information up and until 1990, i.e. it does not take into account changes
occurring immediately prior to AE enrollment15. However, if a drop in pre-program
earnings signals a shock with permanent effects, it is necessary to control for such
changes. We assess the importance of these opposing hypotheses with robustness
checks where relevant covariates reflecting changes 1990–1991 are included in our Pro-
bit specification. The balancing tests then include an additional 22 variables (details
provided in Section 4).
4. Results
Figure 5 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival rates by age of treated and their untreated
matched comparisons, using one-to-one matching. Figure 6 displays the differences be-
tween these survival rates, including 95 per cent confidence intervals for the point
MALES
FEMALES
Figure 5 Kaplan-Meier survival rates by age; treated and matched comparisons.
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females with log rank tests rejecting the hypothesis of no differences. The test statistics
are significant at a one percent level, supporting the hypothesis that higher education
delays retirement16. The differences in survival rates are at ages 61–66 on average 5.6
percentage points for males and 4.5 for females. As an alternative, four-to-one
-matching which in theory improves precision but increases bias, yields average differ-
ences of 4.5 percentage points for males and 4.0 for females, also significant at the one
percent level.
To get an indication of whether our estimates reflect unobserved heterogeneity, we
“trim” our samples by excluding treated individuals in the tails of the propensity score
distributions where common support is the weakest. If unobservable confounders affect
our results; the trimming procedure should yield systematic changes in the estimated
results. An obvious drawback here is that trimming may also affect the results through
heterogeneity in treatment effects. Table 3 contains results where the matching has
been conditioned on trimming. The differences in survival rates remain relatively
stable, and are statistically significant throughout. Importantly, there is little evidence
that the trimming reduces the estimates, which could have been a sign of upward bias
MALES Log rank test of no differences: 13.87 (  -value .000)
FEMALES
p
Log rank test of no differences: 15.55 (  -value .000)p
Figure 6 Matched samples; differences in Kaplan-Meier survival rates by age.
Table 3 Average differences in survival rates at different ages, p-values refer to log-rank
tests of no differences
MALES FEMALES
49-54 55-60 61-66 p-value 49-54 55-60 61-66 p-value
Matching 1:1 .011 .023 .056 .000 .010 .020 .045 .000
Trim 10% .004 .006 .034 .008 .002 .015 .034 .005
Trim 20% .001 .003 .035 .010 .003 .015 .035 .005
Trim 30% -.001 .002 .036 .014 .005 .015 .047 .000
Trim 40% .001 .008 .050 .012 .004 .014 .044 .002
Trim 50% -.004 .000 .050 .005 .004 .017 .050 .003
Matching 4:1 .004 .009 .045 .000 .008 .019 .040 .000
Trim 10% .005 .013 .047 .000 .006 .015 .034 .000
Trim 20% .003 .012 .049 .000 .008 .014 .032 .001
Trim 30% .001 .011 .050 .000 .006 .011 .032 .003
Trim 40% .003 .010 .060 .000 .005 .005 .037 .002
Trim 50% .004 .009 .055 .000 .005 .003 .039 .000
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/16due to unobserved heterogeneity. If an unmeasured confounder still drives these re-
sults, it would have to be close to uniformly distributed in our samples or absent from
the tails of the propensity score distribution.
Overall, treated-untreated differences partly arise before age 60, reflecting early retire-
ment schemes which for the most part are health related. There is also an element of
lay-offs where employers offer employees a deal which includes occupational pension
schemes. For instance, following the IT crisis in 2000–2001, the fractions receiving such
pensions increased by more than 50 percent among individuals aged 60–61 at the time.
However, these arrangements concerned fractions which represented less than one
third of those with early retirement pensions17.
As discussed in Section 3, even if an empirical model successfully controls for differ-
ences in individuals time invariant characteristics, it may be that dynamic factors ex-
plain educational enrollment and later retirement decisions. Extending our matching
model and the balancing tests to include earnings drops and other changes 1990–1991
in transfers and employment status has modest effects on the estimates, increasing the
differences in survival rates at ages 61–66 by less than one percentage point (as consid-
ered across the board)18. The estimates are displayed in Table 4.
As for unobserved dynamic factors, some individuals may enroll education following
decisions to search for jobs, i.e. either to change jobs or increase the number of hours
worked. The concern is that treated enrollees who search for jobs are partly matched
with comparisons not searching for jobs (Heckman and Smith 1999). Potential effects
of job search, e.g. through mobility, could then hypothetically also influence decisions
on the timing of retirement and generate biased estimates. If job-search decisions con-
found our estimates, and if the ability to search is correlated with productivity, we
would expect some job-searchers to drop-out of education following that they find aTable 4 Extended specification of matching model
MALES FEMALES
49-54 55-60 61-66 p-value 49-54 55-60 61-66 p-value
Matching 1:1 .017 .035 .069 .000 .012 .029 .060 .000
Trim 10% .007 .023 .041 .016 .011 .028 .050 .000
Trim 20% .008 .017 .032 .032 .009 .022 .046 .000
Trim 30% .006 .004 .053 .001 .006 .011 .037 .004
Trim 40% .009 .029 .074 .000 .007 .021 .040 .004
Trim 50% .001 .008 .046 .017 .011 .022 .042 .005
Matching 4:1 .009 .016 .047 .000 .008 .018 .045 .000
Trim 10% .008 .024 .057 .000 .009 .024 .053 .000
Trim 20% .004 .018 .054 .000 .009 .021 .050 .000
Trim 30% .003 .020 .065 .000 .008 .015 .047 .000
Trim 40% .005 .024 .072 .000 .008 .012 .044 .000
Trim 50% .006 .022 .066 .000 .007 .006 .038 .002
Average differences in survival rates at different ages, p-values refer to log-rank tests of no differences.
Note: The extended model includes all variables of the baseline model but also balances treated and matched
comparisons on nine possible transitions in labor force status 1990–1991, between employment, unemployment and
outside the labor force (OLF). OLF is defined as annual earnings below SEK 20,000 (app. $3,000) and no transfers related
to unemployment insurance. Also included are indicator variables of newly married or divorced in 1991 and 1992,
changes in amounts of social insurance benefits 1990–1991 and 1991–1992.
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tion and the timing of retirement. Robustness checks indicate results consistent with
the hypothesis that it is education, rather than job-search, which affects the timing of
retirement. Treated individuals who did not complete any education are associated with
very small and insignificant differences in estimated survival (log-rank test p-values
.488 and .395). In contrast, treated individuals completing one year or more display sig-
nificant differences at ages 61–66 amounting to about 6.7 percentage points for males
and 5.6 for females (p-values of .006 and .000).
To check if our results are sensitive to alternative definitions of retirement, we first
extend the definition of labor market activity to also include unemployment insurance
benefits, i.e. on top of annual earnings. The results remain very stable compared with
the ones presented in Table 3, diverging by on average .3 percentage points at ages 61–
66. Second, in Figure 7, we consider part time retirement by defining exit from the
labor market to occur as soon as pension incomes are above zero. Naturally, early re-
tirement then becomes more frequent and only small fractions remain in the labor
force when aged 66. The point estimates of the treatment effect drops; for males to onMALES Log rank test of no differences: 4.36 (   -value .037)
Log rank test of no differences: .60 (   -value .438)FEMALES
p
p
Figure 7 Defining retirement as the first year one receives above zero retirement pension income.
Matched samples. Differences in Kaplan-Meier survival rates by age.
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even further and are on average below one percent, with log-rank tests failing to
reject the null of no differences between treated and untreated19. The result is
partly driven by pension incomes which are substantially lower than labor earnings.
If we employ the definition that retirement occurs when pension transfers exceed
half of annual earnings, estimates again resemble the ones presented in Table 3,
with average differences at ages 61–66 above 4 percent for both males and females
and p-values below .05. In all, the estimates suggest that the positive effects for fe-
males exposed in Table 3 and in Figure 6 largely reflect differences in part-time re-
tirement and/or part-time employment. Thus, while the timing of the first income
from pensions is similar for treated and untreated females, treated remain in the
labor force longer such that their earnings to a greater extent exceed the retire-
ment pension payments.
Finally, we tentatively seek to assess the impact of delayed retirement in terms of an-
nual earnings. Figure 8 presents the average annual earnings and annual retirement
pension payments when aged 59–68, for the treated samples and their matched com-
parisons. One may first of all note that the percentage earnings differences betweenMALES
FEMALES
Figure 8 Matched samples; earnings and pension retirement incomes by age 59–68.
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crease with age (though not always in absolute terms, but at age 64 the treated-
untreated difference represents about 30 percent for both males and females). Ideally,
one would like to distinguish the earnings effect related to delaying retirement from
the conventional earnings premium of education. While we fully acknowledge the diffi-
culties of such a task, one may at least get a rudimentary idea if one uses a benchmark
of the conventional earnings premium and consider the payoff in excess of this bench-
mark as attributable to decisions on the timing of retirement. The returns to higher
education for adults in Sweden are approximately 2–4 percent for males and 7–8 per-
cent for females (Stenberg and Westerlund 2013). We therefore assume treated earn-
ings exceeding untreated by 2–4 and 7–8 percent to be “normal”, but any larger (or
excess) differences we attribute to retirement decisions. The excess earnings differences
in Figure 8 (from age 61 until age 67) sums up to non-trivial amounts. For males, these
correspond to 51 percent of the average annual earnings at age 60, and for females to
62 percent20. Expressed in terms of returns on annual earnings for individuals enrolling
higher education at age 42, with a 25 year perspective (until aged 67), it would for
males correspond to an additional .8 percentage points earnings returns per year of
higher education over the 25 year period and 1.4 percentage points for females. How-
ever, we emphasize that these numbers are based on several untestable assumptions
and should be interpreted with caution21.
5. Conclusions
Long term trends of improved health and increased longevity, combined with
structural changes in the labor market, are likely to increase interest in higher
education of mid-aged and older individuals. The scientific literature on the eco-
nomic effects of such investments in human capital is limited, and the present
study represents a first attempt to estimate effects on the length of working life, i.
e. timing of retirement. Our main finding is that tertiary level education of indi-
viduals aged 42–55 has a potential for extending duration in the work force and
postpone retirement. The magnitudes suggested by our estimates are large and,
more generally, supports longstanding policy recommendations of the EU and the
OECD to invest in education of adults. The quality of the data provides extensive
controls for selectivity into education and the results are robust to alternative as-
sumptions underlying the empirical model regarding potential influence of unob-
served factors.
To extend the validity of our results, further studies from other economic contexts
are required. Policy recommendations would also require a careful assessment of op-
portunity costs as short run costs of education for adults is substantial, not least
due to foregone earnings. For this reason, it is perhaps symptomatic that proposals
for adult education policies emerge from intergovernmental bodies (OECD and EU)
whereas individual governments are more reluctant to stimulate measures which
exert pressure on short run budget targets. This political problem may perhaps
be relaxed by further research, but of course only if it provides supportive results.
Finally, adult education encompasses important non-pecuniary aims, e.g. influencing
democratic functions and public health, which need to be considered when designing
the appropriate policy.
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1Hazan (2009) finds that lifetime labor supply does not increase with life expectancy.
Incorporating the retirement decision into a Ben-Porath model (Ben-Porath 1967), the
result questions the implication that investments in human capital should increase fol-
lowing an increase in expected labor supply (expected life expectancy).
2All else equal, human capital theory specify that the returns to educational invest-
ments decrease with age as there are fewer working years remaining to reap the poten-
tial rewards, and because of higher foregone earnings (Becker 1993). Option value
models of investment in education assume continuously updated information where
unexpected events such as economic fluctuations, changes in health, information or
preferences, may provide incentives for adults to enrol formal education (e.g. Comay
et al. 1973, Cameron and Heckman 2001, Heckman and Urzua 2008, Pissarides 2011).
3The gold standard in evaluation studies is random assignment, but one may note that
studies based on high quality non-experimental data generally have been found to provide
estimates which are cleared from most sources of systematic bias (Heckman and Smith
1999, Table 7, Heckman et al. 1999 ch 10, Smith and Todd 2005, Diaz and Handa 2006).
4On US data, see Autor et al. (2003)), Autor et al. (2008); on data from the UK and
Europe; Goos and Manning (2007), Goos et al. (2009), Spitz-Oener (2006), Dustmann
et al. (2009).
5Private educational institutes exist but like the public universities, they receive a
fixed sum from the government per student when they register for a course and a
roughly equal amount when students have completed the course.
6An alternative path to higher education existed for adults (above 25) with four years
of work experience. Eligibility could then be achieved by completing passing grades in
Swedish and English at a three year upper secondary level. However, these courses were
typically completed at komvux which were not recorded in the official educational
registries. Therefore, individuals who took this path are recorded with less than 12 years
of schooling, and thus excluded from our analyses.
7To avoid conditioning on events occurring after enrollment, treated as well as un-
treated are allowed to register in higher education from 1994 and onwards. Our group
of “untreated” will therefore on average complete small but positive amounts of higher
education, but this has only a marginal impact on our estimates.
8This variable takes the value max [rankit] where t is 1982, 1983,…, 1990. The rank in
year t is based on residual values eit each year of the age adjusted regression: Earningsit
= a + b1*ageit + b2*agesqit + eit.
9For instance, changes in preferences, changes in borrowing constraints, new infor-
mation (e.g. about working environments) and/or changes in relative wages which
increase the expected earnings benefits of AE (Altonji 1993, Iwahashi 2007,
Killingsworth 1982, Monks 1998, Wallace and Ihnen 1975, Warner and Pleeter 2001,
Weiss 1971).
10Labor force participation and employment rates among 55–64 year olds are slightly
higher in Sweden than the OECD average. See Eklöf and Hallberg (2004, 2010) and
Karlström et al. (2004).
11In a seminal paper, Lalonde (1986) reached pessimistic conclusions regarding the
use of non-experimental estimators. Research has since then improved our understand-
ing of how better data makes it possible to avoid the most serious sources of bias.
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(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, Waernbaum 2008). Variables associated with p-values
above .2 were therefore excluded if not essential for the balancing of the samples.
13Further support for our model is that estimates of the returns to higher education,
in a companion paper (Stenberg and Westerlund 2013), is only marginally affected by
the inclusion/exclusion of military enlistment test scores of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. These variables are available for a sample of males aged 29–39 at the time of en-
rollment in 1992–1993, altering the estimated returns (1996–2010) by on average less
than .2 percentage points in absolute terms.
14It is not a problem for our study if treated change their time horizon due to the de-
cision to enroll AE (that is the effect we are after), even if this occurs as early as in con-
nection with the enrollment decision.
15The one exception is information on early retirement pensions in 1991 and 1992,
but leaving out these variables has only a marginal impact on our estimates.
16By construction, the power of the log-rank tests means the hypothesis of no differ-
ences in survival rates may be rejected even though there are point estimates which are
not significantly different from zero.
17One would perhaps expect treated-untreated differences in early retirement to be
larger among females. Compared with males, females’ more frequent career interrup-
tions and/or part time employment make the average pensions schemes less generous.
Also, the earnings returns to education are typically higher for females, presumably
reflecting that there is greater potential for increased work hours (Jacobson et al.
2005a, Stenberg 2011). Both the higher returns and the lower pension schemes of fe-
males could increase treated-untreated differences before age 60, but the estimates in
Table 3 only weakly indicate such a pattern.
18With the extended model, we follow Heckman and Smith (1999) to balance on
transitions in labor force status 1990–1991 between employment, unemployment
and outside the labor force (OLF), in all nine possible transitions. OLF is defined as
annual earnings below SEK 20,000 (app. $3,000) and no transfers related to un-
employment insurance or active labor market programs. Also included are indicator
variables of newly married or divorced in 1991 and 1992, changes in status of child
at home aged 0–3, 4–6 or 7–10 and amounts of each of the social insurance bene-
fits 1990–1991 and 1991–1992, as well as changes in annual earnings and UI pay-
ments 1990–1991.
19The estimates for females at ages 61–66 are very low across all our robustness
checks, on average .7 (for males 2.6) with p-values of the log-rank test between .49 and
.96 (for males, nine tests out of twelve are below .10). The one-to-one matching actu-
ally yields relatively similar estimates of males and females (averages of 1.9 and 1.6 and
p-values of .125 and .150 respectively). To simplify our exposition, the four-to-one
matching case is the one exposed in Figure 7. While the one-to-one matching is pre-
ferred, the adjacent results still need to be considered.
20To avoid exaggerating the impact of delayed retirement on earnings, we assume it
is only represented by returns to education which exceed 5 percent for males and 10
percent for females. Assuming returns to education of 3 and 7 percent instead yields
sums corresponding to 57 percent for males and 76 percent for females. The average
earnings at age 60 refer to those of the matched comparisons.
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earnings difference attributable to delayed retirement. Given the average earnings at
age 42, we extrapolate a percentage increase in earnings streams over 25 years (going
forward in time) which produces a similar present value. The percentages stated are
based on treated completing some tertiary education. The returns increase slightly if
one uses the full sample of treated.
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